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The Invisible Soldiers: How America Outsourced Our Security
By Ann Hagedorn
Reviewed by Steven L. Schooner, Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government 
Procurement Law, George Washington University Law School (US Army, 
retired).
M ilitary historians may someday conclude that, despite the emer-gence of  the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV or drone) as a modern 
marvel of  information collection, targeting, and weapons delivery, this 
generation’s most significant battlefield evolution involved people. Never 
before has a nation’s military enjoyed the capacity, facilitated by the 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), to deploy an unlim-
ited number of  warfighters swiftly, without geographical limitation, and 
indefinitely sustain that fighting force with an unprecedented level of  
readiness. Such surge capacity and flexibility come at a steep price, both 
fiscal and moral, which will be debated for many years to come.
But for all the controversy generated by the government’s pervasive 
outsourcing of battlefield support, it is the post-millennial proliferation 
of arms-bearing contractors that roiled the human rights community and 
catalyzed a global conversation about the nature and future of modern 
warfare. This new breed of weapon-toting contractors – serving as 
guards, escorts, police, advisors, and trainers, but cumulatively perceived 
in the contingency area as soldier-like, and called everything from private 
military and privatized security to mercenaries—draws Ann Hagedorn’s 
ire and anxiety. And she is not alone.
Peter W. Singer’s now familiar Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the 
Privatized Military Industry, introduced professional readers to the 
increasingly sophisticated arms-bearing contractor industry and the 
accelerating trend of state reliance on these firms. Others, including, 
but by no means limited to, Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: The 
Consequences of Privatizing Security, James Jay Carafano, Private Sector, Public 
Wars: Contractors in Combat - Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts, David 
Isenberg, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq, Allison Stanger, 
One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future 
of Foreign Policy, and Laura Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace: Preserving 
Public Values in a World of Privatized Foreign Affairs, further illuminated 
a shadowy, seemingly unregulated, globalized, and disaggregated 
population of former soldiers, shrewd businessmen, soldiers of fortune, 
adventurers, opportunists, and, of course, the occasional cast-off, rogue, 
ruffian, and scoundrel.
Hagedorn, like many of her predecessors, struggles for objectivity, 
but makes no effort to hide her frustrations. Still, Invisible Soldiers fills a 
niche in that its publication follows the peaks and the drawdowns of the 
Bush and Obama administrations’ deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
in which contractors (of all types) outnumbered uniformed service-
members, in both service and, at times, sacrifice. Accordingly, Invisible 
Soldiers offers a more complete retrospective on the proliferation of 
arms bearing contractors in contingency environments peppered with a 
healthy dose of skepticism for the future.
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A gifted story teller, Hagedorn displays the journalistic skills and 
instincts she honed at the Wall Street Journal by introducing her book 
with a lengthy, engaging, and compelling, but, ultimately irrelevant, 
anecdote. To be fair, Hagedorn deserves credit for leading with the 
unique and poignant tragedy of Kadhim Alkanni, rather than resorting 
to Blackwater’s Nissour Square debacle, now destined to occupy, for 
Iraq, the inflammatory space that the 1968 My Lai Massacre carved out 
in Vietnam. (That said, Nissour Square receives fully adequate coverage 
in Hagedorn’s book.) Other critical, and admittedly colorful, players—
Tim Spicer of Sandline and Aegis, Blackwater founder Erik Prince, 
and Doug Brooks, who for many years was the burgeoning security 
industry’s organizing and sophisticated voice—feature prominently. Yet 
serious policy readers and military historians might be more interested in 
analyzing the policy role of Gary J. Motesk—DoD’s point person—on 
outsourcing of military and security functions, who somehow escaped 
mention in this volume.
Ultimately, Hagedorn recognizes the military had little control over 
the policy vacuum that led to the swift and dramatic dilution of the 
government’s traditional monopoly over the use of force. Rather than 
resulting from a careful, reasoned, and voluntary delegation of authority 
to the private sector in conformance with global trends, the US govern-
ment’s outsourcing of military and security functions was necessitated 
by politically popular but empirically unjustified Congressional troop 
caps, requiring non-DoD actors to rely on arms bearing contractors 
for, among other things, personal security in a hostile environment. 
(138) “How else could the nation have engaged in two wars—Iraq and 
Afghanistan—simultaneously without reinstituting the draft?” (160).
The poster child anecdote was the State Department’s reliance on its 
Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract—originally a centrally 
managed source for private security at embassies—which morphed 
as the population of diplomats and related officials, employees, and 
support staff multiplied in Iraq. Meanwhile, scores of security firms 
from around the world entered the region under commercial subcon-
tracts with the unprecedented number of contractors supporting every 
conceivable aspect of the Defense, State, and Agency for International 
Development departments’ missions in the region. References to the 
eclectic and incendiary Star Wars cantina scenes frequently prompted 
knowing head nods in conferences discussing the private security pro-
liferation phenomenon.
Hagedorn appears to overstate the policy debate between propo-
nents “who firmly believe...in the importance of the private military 
contractors and ha(ve) no intention of regulating them” (101) and oppo-
nents of the government’s reliance on private security in contingency 
operations. No doubt, her clear abolitionist preference is tempered by 
her recognition the outsourcing train left the station long ago. The real-
ists, or, if you prefer, cynics, realize—for the foreseeable future—the 
heart of the matter lies in government regulation and management, not 
the esoteric aspiration of elimination, of private security.
Here, Hagedorn’s extensive notes and index demonstrate she took her 
homework seriously. As a late comer to the literature, Invisible Soldiers 
is able to introduce readers to the Montreaux initiative, an important 
and laudable global coalition aspiring to bring regulatory order to this 
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rapidly evolving and chaotic industry. Closer to home, Hagedorn’s 
frustration with the US government’s lackadaisical management of the 
industry is palpable: “The British, including journalists, human rights 
advocates, politicians, military experts, and private security executives, 
began sorting out the issues of private military companies years before 
the Americans.” (255) Hagedorn also remains justifiably skeptical of 
industry self-regulation. Alas, she fares no better than her colleagues in 
suggesting practical, concrete alternatives. 
Hagedorn’s perspective and insights on arms bearing contractors, 
democracies, and empires—intensely personal, yet thoughtfully cogni-
zant of policy, political theory, and philosophy—should interest readers 
new to the field, as well as those well versed in the issues. Outsourcing 
the use of force is sufficiently important to the future of democratic 
states that this book—as well as the growing corpus of literature it adds 
to—merits serious contemplation.
